Abstract-We consider the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, with no eavesdropper's channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT). We determine the exact sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) for this channel by providing a new alignment based achievable scheme and a matching converse. Our results show that the lack of eavesdropper's CSIT does not have a significant impact on the optimal s.d.o.f. of the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, especially when the number of users is large.
in this case.
To that end, we provide an achievable scheme based on asymptotic real interference alignment [4] , [5] . We consider the case of fixed channel gains in this paper. Our work can be extended to the case of fading channel gains using a scheme based on vector space alignment [1] , that achieves the same optimal sum s.d.o.f. of K−1 2 ; we omit the scheme here due to space constraints, see [6] . An interesting aspect of our proposed scheme is that it provides confidentiality of the messages This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111 and CCF 14-22129. not only from the external eavesdropper but also from the unintended legitimate receivers. Thus, our scheme achieves the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the K-user interference channel with both confidential messages and an external eavesdropper, with no eavesdropper CSIT.
To prove the converse, we combine techniques from [3] and [7] . We exploit a key result in [7] that the output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is not available is at least as large as the output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is available, even when the transmitters cooperate and transmit correlated signals. Intuitively, this is true since no alignment of signals is possible at the receiver whose CSIT is unavailable. Using this insight along with the techniques of [3] , we establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f. to be eavesdropper's CSIT. For the K-user multiple access wiretap channel, reference [11] shows that when the eavesdropper's CSIT is not available, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. decreases from
K , and the K-user multiple access wiretap channel reduces to a wiretap channel with K − 1 helpers. For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper too, we see that the optimal sum s.d.o.f. decreases from 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The input output relations for the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, Fig. 1 , are
where Y i is the channel output of receiver i, Z is the channel output at the eavesdropper, X j is the channel input of transmitter j, h ji is the channel gain from transmitter j to receiver i, g j is the channel gain from transmitter j to the eavesdropper, and {N 1 , . . . , N K , N Z } are mutually independent zero-mean unitvariance white Gaussian noise random variables. The channel gains h ji s and g i s are assumed to be drawn from an arbitrary but fixed continuous distribution with bounded support. The channel gains to the eavesdropper, g i s are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs satisfy average power constraints E[X 2 i ] ≤ P , for i = 1, . . . , K. Transmitter i wishes to send a message W i , chosen uniformly from a set W i , to receiver i. The messages W 1 , . . . , W K are mutually independent. A secure rate tuple (R 1 , . . . , R K ), with R i = log |Wi| n is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receivers, namely, Pr[W i =Ŵ i ] ≤ n , for i = 1, . . . , K, and the security condition
where
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The main result of this paper is the determination of the exact sum s.d.o.f. of the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, when no eavesdropper CSI is available at the transmitters. We present the main result of this paper in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper and no eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. d s is given by,
for almost all channel gains.
We present the converse proof for Theorem 1 in Section IV, and an achievable scheme in Section V. Let us now highlight a few interesting aspects of our result. First, we consider the cost of security against an external eavesdropper. Without any security constraints, in the absence of the external eavesdropper, the optimal sum d.o.f. is 
IV. PROOF OF THE CONVERSE
To prove the converse, we combine techniques from [3] , [10] and [7] . Here, we use X i to denote the collection of all channel inputs {X i (t), t = 1, . . . , n} of transmitter i. Similarly, we use Y i and Z to denote the channel outputs at legitimate receiver i and the eavesdropper, respectively, over n channel uses. We further define X K 1 as the collection of all channel inputs from all of the transmitters, i.e., {X i , i = 1, . . . , K}. Finally, for a fixed j, we define
We divide the proof into three steps.
1) Deterministic channel model: We consider the deterministic channel given as,
for i = 1, . . . , K, with the constraint that
We show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the channel in (5)- (6) instead of the one in (1)- (2) by proving that given any codeword tuple (X
P , for the deterministic channel of (5)- (6) , that achieves an
Defining Z G and Z D similarly, it suffices to show that
for every i = 1, . . . , K. The proof of (8) follows along similar lines as the proof presented in [7] and is omitted here. To prove (9), we defineZ(t)
Here, (13) follows since H(Ẑ(t)) ≤ o(log P ) following the steps of the proof in [7, Appendix A.2] . In addition, H(Z| Z G ) ≤ no(log P ), using [12, Lemma E.1, Appendix E]; see [6] for details. Therefore, the s.d.o.f. of the deterministic channel in (5)- (6) with integer channel inputs as described in (7) (1)- (2). Thus, we will consider this deterministic channel in the remaining part of the converse.
2) An upper bound on the sum rate: We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [10] , i.e., [10, Lemma 1] . Note that, unlike [10, Lemma 1], channel inputs are integer here:
where (19) follows since H(Y K 1 , Z|X K 1 ) = 0. Also, to ensure decodability at the legitimate receiver, we use the role of a helper lemma in [10] , i.e., [10, Lemma 2] ,
for any j = i, and (23) holds under a mild technical condition on the common distribution F of the channel gains:
|h| dF (h) ≤ c for some c ∈ R; see [6] . Using (23) and (20), we obtain,
where = o(log P ). Dividing by n and letting n → ∞,
Now dividing by 1 2 log P and taking P → ∞,
3) Bounding the difference of entropies: Now, we enhance the system by relaxing the condition that channel inputs from different transmitters are mutually independent, and think of the K single antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus, we wish to maximize H(Y K ) − H(Z), where Y K and Z are two single antenna receiver outputs, under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at the transmitter. This brings us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [7] . We know from [7, eqns. (75)- (103)] that even without any security or decodability constraints, the difference of entropies, H(Y K ) − H(Z) cannot be larger than no(log P ), if the channel gains to the second receiver is unknown. Thus,
Using (28) in (27), we have
This completes the converse proof of Theorem 1.
V. AN ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
For the sake of clarity of exposition, here, we present the achievable scheme for the special case of K = 3 instead of the general K-user scheme [6] . We use the technique of asymptotic real interference alignment introduced in [5] . Fig. 2 shows the desired signal alignment at the receivers and the eavesdropper. In the figure, the boxes labeled by V denote the message symbols, while the hatched boxes labeled with U denote artificial noise symbols. It is clear from Fig. 2 that 2 out of 6 signal dimensions are buried in the artificial noise. Thus, heuristically, the s.d.o.f. for each legitimate user pair is the channel gains. This ensures that the c i s are rationally independent of each other and of the channel gains almost surely. Now, we define four sets T i , i = 1, . . . , 4, as follows: 
Let M i be the cardinality of the set T i . Note that all the M i s are same, which we denote by M :
We subdivide each message W i into 2 independent submessages V ij , j = 1, . . . , 4, j = i, i + 1. For each transmitter i, let p ij be the vector containing all the elements of T j , for j = i, i+1. For any given (i, j) with j = i, i+1, p ij represents the dimension along which message V ij is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let q i andq i be vectors containing all the elements in sets T i and β i T i+1 , respectively, where β i = 1 hii for i = 1, 2 and β 3 = 1. The vectors q i andq i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols U i andŨ i , respectively, are sent. We define a 4M dimensional vector b i by stacking the p ij s, q i andq i as
The transmitter encodes V ij using an M dimensional vector v ij , and the cooperative jamming signals U i andŨ i using M dimensional vectors u i andũ i , respectively. Each element of v ij , u i andũ i are drawn uniformly in an i.i.d. fashion from the PAM constellation C(a, Q) ∆ = a{−Q, −Q + 1, . . . , Q − 1, Q}, where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number, whose values will be specified later. Let
The channel input of transmitter i is then given by
Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the receivers. For example, consider receiver 1. The desired signals at receiver 1, v 13 and v 14 arrive along dimensions h 11 T 3 and h 11 T 4 , respectively. Since only T i (and not T j , j = i) contains c i , these dimensions are rationally independent. Thus, they appear along different columns in Fig. 2 . The artificial noise symbols u 1 , u 2 , u 3 andũ 3 arrive along dimensions h 11 T 1 , h 21 T 2 , h 31 T 3 and h 31 T 4 , respectively. Again they are all rationally separate and thus, appear along different columns in Fig. 2 We defineT 2 ,T 3 andT 4 similarly. We note that the unintended signals v 32 and v 24 arrive along h 31 T 2 and h 21 T 4 and thus, align with u 2 andũ 3 , respectively, inT 2 andT 4 . Thus, they appear in the same column in Fig. 2 . Finally, the artificial noise symbolsũ 1 andũ 2 align with u 2 and u 3 , respectively. A similar analysis is true for receivers 2 and 3 also. At the eavesdropper, there is no alignment, since the channel gains of the eavesdropper are not known at the transmitters. The artificial noise symbols all arrive along different dimensions at the eavesdropper, exhausting its decoding capability.
We note that the interference at each receiver is confined to the dimensionsT 1 ,T 2 ,T 3 andT 4 . Further, these dimensions are separate from the dimensions occupied by the desired signals at each receiver. Thus, the set 
is achievable, where V i is an auxiliary random variable satisfying V i → X i → Y, Z, and V −i denotes the collection {V j , j = i}. First, we can upper bound the probability of error at each receiver. Let
. Then, for any δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which is independent of P , such that if we choose Q = P Q , then for almost all channel gains the average power constraint is satisfied and the probability of error is bounded by
where η γi is a positive constant which is independent of P andV i is the estimate for 
≤ 1 2 log P − H(U ) + o(log P ) (45)
where (45) follows from the fact that U and V 3 1 are independent, and since given V 3 1 and Z, U can be decoded as the u i s andũ i s occupy independent rational dimensions at the eavesdropper. Now, combining (42) and (46), we have,
By choosing δ small enough and choosing m large enough, we can make R i arbitrarily close to 
VI. CONCLUSION
We determined the exact sum s.d.o.f. of the interference channel with an external eavesdropper when there is no eavesdropper CSIT. We proposed a new achievable scheme based on real interference alignment that not only provides security against the external eavesdropper, but also against other unintended legitimate receivers as well. We also provided a matching converse. Our results showed that the lack of eavesdropper's CSIT does not decrease the sum s.d.o.f. significantly, especially when the number of users is large.
